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dant's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process65 rights for the
trial court to keep from the jury knowledge of defendant's
parole ineligibility. Watkins sought to extend the Simmons
holding to his own situation, where a life sentence carried the
possibility of parole after twenty years.6 The court of appeals
did not reach the substance of Watkins' assertion, however,
because in O'Dell v. Netherland,67 the United States Supreme
Court held that Simmons was a new rule under Teague v.
Lane.63 Therefore, subject to narrow exceptions which did
not apply toWatkins' case, Simmons could not be retroactive-
6 See note 25,supra.
nFor a discussion of jury misconceptions regarding the mean-
ing of a life sentence, see Jenio, "Life"=Life: Correcting Juror
Misconceptions, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 4 0 . (1997).
67117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997). See Case Summary of O'Dell, Cap. Def.
J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 4 (1997).
-489 U.S. 288 (1989).
ly applied. The court of appeals observed that Watkins' con-
viction became final in 1989, five years before Simmons, and
thus that Simmons did not apply to Watkins' case.6The United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that the Simmons rule
was a new rule with respect to the legal landscape of 1988
(and presumably prior to that), and therefore, that all convic-
tions which became final prior to 1989 are not subject to
Simmons. Although not explicitly stated in O'Dell, it is unlike-
ly that the Court would find the Simmons rule to be an"old"
rule at any time before the decision of Simmons itself, in 1994.
Summary and analysis by:
Craig B. Lane
"Watkins v.Angelone, No. 97-9,1998WL 2861, at *11 (4th Cir.
Jan. 7, 1998) (citing O'Dell, 117 S.Ct at 1973).
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BY: TOMMY BARRETt
L Introduction
At the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the
Virginia statutory scheme requires the Commonwealth to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of two statu-
tory aggravating factors.' In proving the future dangerous-
ness aggravator, the Virginia statute permits the
Commonwealth to introduce, and the jury or court to con-
sider, evidence of "the history and background of the defen-
dant." 2 This language has been interpreted to include evi-
dence of "unadjudicated acts,' i.e. criminal acts allegedly
committed by the defendant for which the defendant was
never tried or possibly even charged.' Unadjudicated acts,
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995).This section per-
mits the death penalty to be imposed if Commonwealth proves
that"there is a probability that the defendant would commit crim-
inal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society"- what is commonly referred to as "future dan-
gerousness" aggravator. Alternatively, the death penalty may be
imposed if the Commonwealth proves that the defendant's con-
duct in committing the instant offense was "outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravi-
ty of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim"-what is com-
monly referred to as the "vileness" aggravator. Vrginia Code
Section 19.2-264.4(C) requires the Commonwealth to prove either
or both aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt.
2Va. CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 1995). See alsoVa. Code
Ann. § 19.2- 264.4(C), stating that a finding of future dangerousness
may be based on "evidence of the prior history of the defendant'
'Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225Va. 289,298,302 S.E.2d 520,
526 (1983).
to be admissible, need only demonstrate a probability that
the defendant would commit future criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a future danger to society.
Unlike previous journal articles that have discussed the
use of unadjudicated acts in capital sentencing, 4 this one
focuses solely on the Due Process requirement of height-
ened reliability in capital sentencing. The Supreme Court
has recognized two principles, individualized sentencing
and heightened reliability, as constitutionally necessary for
any capital sentencing scheme.The Virginia capital sentenc-
ing scheme embraces the principle of individualized sen-
tencing by permitting the jury or court to consider all rele-
vant evidence, including unadjudicated acts of violence
allegedly committed by the defendant.The Virginia scheme
has, however, neglected the constitutional requirement of
heightened reliability. Neither the Virginia capital sentenc-
ing statute nor the Supreme Court of Virginia requires the
sentencer to find that the defendant in fact committed the
unadjudicated acts of violence by any standard of proof.The
4See Fenn, Anything Someone Else Says Can and Will be Used
Against You in a Court of Law: The Use of Unadjudicated Acts in
Capital Sentencing, Cap. Def. Dig.,Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31 (1993) (con-
sidering generally the use of unadjudicated acts in capital sentenc-
ing and suggesting trial strategies to minimize their effect);
Mclndoe, Is A Standard of Proof Required for the Evaluation of
UnadjudicatedActs in Capital Sentencing?, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 9, No.
2, p. 52 (1997) (arguing that a recent Supreme Court case implicit-
ly requires a capital jury to find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant committed the unadjudicated acts before
relying upon such evidence in assessing future dangerousness).
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Due Process Clause requirement of heightened reliability
mandates that the sentencer must first find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged
unadjudicated acts before it may consider those acts in
determining future dangerousness.
ML WhyUnadjtuicatedActs Require Special Consideration
In determining the defendant's future dangerousness,
evidence of unadjudicated acts of violence are highly rele-
vant. Due to their high degree of relevancy, coupled with
both the unreliability of an unadjudicated act and the often
suspect sources from which such evidence originates, unad-
judicated acts necessitate a more cautious and focused con-
sideration than other types of evidence.
Evidence of future dangerousness comes in three gen-
eral forms: expert opinion testimony, the defendant's record
of convictions for violent crimes, and evidence of unadjudi-
cated acts of violence. Unadjudicated acts of violence, like
the defendant's record of convictions for violent crimes, are
highly relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry.The lan-
guage of the future dangerousness aggravator requires the
jury to determine whether the defendant "would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat of violence'The jury is not asked to deter-
mine whether the defendant poses some type of abstract
future danger, but rather whether the defendant would
commit criminal acts that would constitute a future danger.
It is hard to imagine any evidence more relevant to this
determination than whether the defendant has committed
criminal acts of violence in the past.
Likewise, it is hard to imagine that any type of inaccu-
rate information could be more unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant than inaccurate information about previous acts
of violence. Unlike the defendant's record of criminal con-
victions, evidence of unadjudicated acts does not carry any
degree of reliability. The defendant's criminal convictions
have been tested by an adversarial trial and proven beyond
a reasonable doubt; unadjudicated acts allegedly committed
by the defendant are untested and have been proven by, at
most, a preponderance and more often, by no standard
whatsoever. Moreover, expert opinion testimony, about
whether the defendant poses a future danger, often assumes
that the defendant committed the prior unadjudicated acts
of violence alleged by the Commonwealth. In short, inaccu-
rate information that the defendant committed previous
acts of violence is like a contagious disease; its harmful
effects are not limited to the evidence itself but can spread
and infect other evidence with which it comes into con-
tact.
Another reason unadjudicated acts require greater
scrutiny is that they lack the quantum of proof assured by a
criminal adjudication. In a criminal trial each element of
the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is not enough for the Commonwealth to produce
accurate evidence. It also must produce a sufficient amount
of evidence to convince the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged.The
Virginia capital sentencing scheme lacks a standard of proof
by which the jury must find that an unadjudicated act
occurred. Due to this lack of a standard of proof, a great dan-
ger exists that the jury's inquiry will devolve into asking
whose testimony it believes more, the defendant or the
Commonwealth's witness, rather than asking the pertinent
questions- did the alleged unadjudicated act occur and did
the defendant commit it?
When the jury's determination is reduced to a credibil-
ity contest between the Commonwealth's witness and the
defendant about whether a particular unadjudicated act
occurred, a tremendous amount of unreliability is injected
into the jury's life or death decision. Yeatts v.
Commonwealth5 is an example of such a credibility con-
test, though by no means the only one, in which the evi-
dence would likely be insufficient for a criminal conviction
but is relied upon to impose the death penalty.ThereYeatts'
sister-in-law claimed he raped her.A "friend" of Yeatts testi-
fied that Yeatts urged him to rape Yeatts' sister-in-law but
that he refused. Yeatts claimed that this allegation was
"beyond belief."6 Nothing in the court's opinion suggests
that there was any physical evidence that the sister-in-law
had been raped or that Yeatts had raped her; the only evi-
dence of the rape, apparently, was the testimony described
above.The court, in a footnote, said simply that the question
of the sister-in-law's credibility was one for the jury.
7
Clearly, the defendant is at a severe disadvantage in this
type of credibility contest. Unlike at the guilt phase where
the defendant is presumed innocent, at a capital sentencing
proceeding the defendant has little if any credibility remain-
ing, having just been found guilty of at least a capital mur-
der by the jury. It betrays common sense to suggest that this
same jury can fairly and impartially judge this credibility
contest. No matter how suspect the testimony of the
Commonwealth's witness would be normally, such as that
of a jailhouse snitch, the witness still has more credibility
with the jury than the defendant. Thus the Common-
wealth's witness should always win this credibility contest.
But the mere fact that the Commonwealth's witness is
judged to be more credible than the defendant, given the
circumstances, does not provide any meaningful indication
that the jury was convinced that the act occurred and that
the defendant did it. In fact, without a standard of proof to
focus and inform the jury's inquiry, nothing guarantees that
the jury even considered the possibility that the act might
5242 Va. 121,410 S.E.2d 254 (1991). For another example of
the dangers of a credibility contest, see the testimony of Sylvester
Joyner in Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157
(1987). In Gray, Sylvester Joyner a fellow inmate of Gray's, claimed
that Gray told him that he had killed a man in California. Gray
denied killing a man in California and making such a statement to
Joyner. Nothing in the court's opinion suggests that there was any
evidence of who Gray supposedly killed in California, whether
such a person existed, whether such a person was killed, or
whether there was any evidence linking Gray to a murder in
California. For a more recent example, see the Case Summary of
Eaton v.Angelone, Cap. Def.J., this issue.
6Yeatts, 242 Va. at 139,410 S.E.2d at 265.
71d. at 141 n.9, 410 S.E.2d at 266 n.9.
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not have occurred or that the defendant might not have com-
mitted it.In shorthe Virginia capital sentencing scheme, by fail-
ing to require a standard of proof for unadjudicated acts, leaves
the sentencer's determination of whether to impose death
highly susceptible to inaccurate and insufficient information.
III. The Constitutional Requirements For Capital
Sentencing
As one federal district court has stated, "the issue of
unadjudicated criminal conduct lurks squarely at the inter-
section (read collision) of two powerful but competing prin-
ciples of death penalty jurisprudence: 8 Those principles are
the Eighth Amendment principle of individualized sentenc-
ing and the Fourteenth Amendment principle of heightened
reliability. The Supreme Court, despite several petitions for
certiorari and the urgings of two justices,9 has never direct-
ly ruled on the constitutionality of admitting unadjudicated
acts in a capital sentencing proceeding. 0 But, by returning
to the foundations of the Court's modem death penalty
jurisprudence, it is possible to discern the constitutionality
of Virginia's practice of admitting evidence of unadjudicated
acts without a corresponding standard of proof.
The Supreme Court's modem death penalty jurispru-
dence begins with Furman v. Georgia. " Furman held that the
death penalty was being imposed and carried out in a manner
that violated the Eighth and FourteenthAmendments.' 2 While
two justices found the death penalty unconstitutional per se, 3
three others voted to reverse the convictions because the dis-
cretionary sentencing schemes before the court were"unguid-
ed by any legislatively defined standards" 4 Thus, Furman
stands for the broad and vague proposition that the Eighth and
FourteenthAmendments require guided discretion.
The Court revisited the death penalty four years later in
a series of five cases decided on July 2, 1976."1 Furman's
8United States v.Walke, 910 E Supp. 837, 852 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
9Robertson v. California, 493 U.S. 879,879 (1989)(Marshall,J.,
joined by BrennanJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Sharp v.
Texas, 488 U.S. 872,872 (1988)(Marshall,J., joined by Brennan,J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); Miranda v. California, 486 U.S.
1038,1038 (1987) (Marshall,J., joined by Brennan,J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Devier v. Kemp, 484 U.S. 948, 948-49
(1987)XMarshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 935,935 (1987) (Marshall,
J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
"°Steven Paul Smith, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of
Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases of
Capital Trials, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 1249,1250 (1993).
"408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
1Id. at 305-06 (Brennan,J., concurring); at 370-71 (Marshal,J.,
concurring).
"Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,599 (1978).
" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);Proffitt v.Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
broad principle of guided discretion was broken into two
separate constitutional principles. The two constitutional
principles that emerged from those cases were the Eighth
Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing and
the FourteenthAmendment requirement of heightened reli-
ability. The following key passage from Woodson v. North
Carolina6 expresses both:
While the prevailing practice of individual-
ized sentencing determinations generally sim-
ply reflects enlightened policy rather than a
constitutional imperative, we believe that in
capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the EighthAmendment.
.. requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a con-
stitutionally indispensable part of inflicting
the penalty of death. This conclusion rests
squarely on the predicate that the penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence
of imprisonment, however long ... Because of
that qualitative difference, there is a corre-
sponding difference in the need for reliability
in the determination that death is the appro-
priate punishment in a specific case.
7
The statement that "the Eighth Amendment requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender" expresses the constitutional principle of individu-
alized sentencing.The Court's subsequent recognition that
because death is different from any other punishment,
"there is corresponding need for reliability" in the jury or
court's determination "that death is the appropriate pun-
ishment," embodies the principle of heightened reliability.
Arguably, Woodson holds that individualized sentencing is
necessary to produce heightened reliability. Under this
reading, the principles of individualized sentencing and
heightened reliability are not competing principles but
rather the mean to an end.There is indeed some validity to
the notion that the more information a jury or court has
about a defendant the more able it will be to make a rea-
soned determination about whether death is the appropri-
ate punishment.
A closer reading of the above passage from Woodson
demonstrates, however, that individualized sentencing and
heightened reliability are two distinct, and often competing
principles. In a key phrase, "[t]his conclusion; the Court
refers to its conclusion that while individualized sentencing
is usually only a matter of enlightened policy in a non-capi-
tal case, it is part of the constitutionally required process in
a capital case. Thus, the principle of heightened reliability
stands for the general proposition that extra process, which
may be merely enlightened policy in a non-capital case, may
be constitutionally required in a capital case.
16428 U.S. 280 (1976).
'7 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05 (citations omitted).
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Similarly, the Court's reference to individualized sen-
tencing as "a constitutionally indispensable part" of inflict-
ing the death penalty necessarily implies the existence of
other constitutionally required parts of a capital sentencing
proceeding. If individualized consideration was the only
constitutional requirement there would be no need to limit
it to being merely a "part" of the process. Implicitly then,
there are other constitutionally indispensable parts of the
sentencing process for imposing death.
Heightened reliability is, at the very least, another con-
stitutionally required part of the capital sentencing process.
In fact, the Woodson passage indicates that heightened reli-
ability is the overarching constitutional requirement for
capital sentencing. In the passage, it is the principle of
heightened reliability that elevates individualized sentenc-
ing to the level of constitutional requirement. Regardless of
whether heightened reliability is a constitutional principle
of equal weight with individualized sentencing or is the
overarching constitutional requirement, one thing is
irrefutably true. It would be a severe misreading of
Woodson to allow the principle of individualized sentenc-
ing to undermine the reliability of a jury's decision to
impose the death penalty. Individualized sentencing was
intended to increase reliability in the jury's life or death
determination, not diminish it.
These two competing constitutional principles were
also expressed in some of the other cases decided on July
2, 1976. Jurek v. Texas's enunciated the "all relevant evi-
dence" doctrine.The Court stated,"A jury must be allowed
to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only
why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it
should not be 'imposed 19 The all relevant evidence doc-
trine is simply a different formulation of the constitutional
requirement of individualized "consideration of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender" as expressed in
Woodson. The all relevant evidence doctrine is used inter-
changeably with the principle of individualized sentencing.
Jurek arguably has additional significance in relation to the
Virginia statutory scheme because the Texas and Virginia
statutes use identical language to define future dangerous-
ness. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
citedJurek as constitutional support for allowing the sen-
tencer to consider unadjudicated acts in determining future
dangerousness 0
WhileJurek provided additional support for the princi-
ple of individualized sentencing, Gregg v. Georgia2' provid-
ed similar support for heightened reliability. After first not-
18428 U.S. 262 (1976).
'9Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271.
2OSee e.g. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 487, 331
S.E.2d 422, 436 (1985); Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521,
530,352 S.E.2d 342,347 (1987).
21428 U.S. 153 (1976).
ing the importance of individualized sentencing, the Court
in Gregg stated:
If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces
the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a
vital need for accurate sentencing informa-
tion about defendant and the crime he com-
mitted in order to be able to impose a ratio-
nal sentence in a typical criminal case, then
accurate sentencing information is an indis-
pensable prerequisite to a reasoned determi-
nation of whether a defendant shall live or
die by a jury of people who may never before
have made a sentencing decision."
This passage, when considered along with the above
passage from Woodson, further develops and defines the
principle of heightened reliability. Initially, the passage is
another example of the principle of heightened reliability.
Its essential message is that what is important in the normal
criminal case, in this instance accurate sentencing informa-
tion, is an indispensable prerequisite in a capital case. It is
remarkably similar to the passage from Woodson. Both
express the notion that the context of capital case elevates
an enlightened practice or important need into a constitu-
tionally indispensable part of imposing the death penalty.
But the passage from Gregg is more than a mere exam-
ple of heightened reliability. More importantly, it casts the
principle of heightened reliability in terms of the accuracy
or quality of the evidence the jury considers.A comparison
of the passage from Woodson with this one from Gregg
establish the dual aspects of heightened reliability. In the
former case, heightened reliability centered on the quantity
of information; it demanded that the sentencer be given a
more complete picture of the defendant than his or her
criminal record. In the latter case, heightened reliability
focused on the quality of the information; it deemed accu-
rate sentencing information to be an indispensable part of
inflicting death.What a comparison of these passages does
not reveal, however, is how a conflict between the quantity
and the quality of sentencing information is to be resolved.
This is the precise dilemma presented by evidence of unad-
judicated acts of violence allegedly committed by the defen-
dant.Although the Court has yet to directly address the pre-
cise issue of unadjudicated conduct, it has, in at least one
other capital case, considered and resolved a conflict
between the quantity of evidence and quality of it.
In Gardner v. Florida,3 the Court held that the defen-
dant was denied due process when a death sentence was
imposed in part on secret information in a pre-sentence
report that he had no opportunity to deny or explain. 2' For
two reasons Gardner is significant to the development of
'Gregg, 428 at 190 (emphasis added).
21430 U.S. 349 (1977).
2"Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
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the principle of heightened reliability beyond the precise
issue presented in that case. First and foremost, the Court
explicitly recognized what was implicit in the 1976 series
of cases: the Due Process Clause applies to the sentencing
process because death is fundamentally unlike any other
punishment.25 The Due Process Clause, thus explicitly
became the constitutional foundation for the principle of
heightened reliability.'
Secondly, Gardner provides an example of how the
Court has treated a conflict between the quantity of infor-
mation and the quality of it. In Gardner, the Court
expressed concern about a sentencing process that allowed
the quality and reliability of sentencing information to be
trumped by an alleged need for a greater quantity of infor-
mation.The Court stated:
The availability of [information about a defen-
dant's background or character], it is argued,
provides the person who prepares the report
with greater detail on which to base a sen-
tencing recommendation and, in turn, pro-
vides the judge with a better basis for his sen-
tencing decision. But consideration must be
given to the quality, as well as quantity, of the
sentencing information on which the sen-
tencing judge may rely.'
The passage makes clear that quantity of information is
not the sole standard for capital sentencing, but that quality
of information must be taken into account as well. The
Court continued and added further, that if the secret infor-
mation of the defendant's character and background is the
basis for a death sentence,"the interest in reliability plainly
outweighs the State's interest in preserving the availability
of comparable information in other cases."' In Gardner, the
state had argued that disclosure of the evidence of a defen-
dant's background or character might prevent some people
from coming forward and thus impair the state's ability to
present all relevant evidence. Despite that possibility, the
Court essentially held that the all relevant evidence doc-
trine must yield to the need for reliability.
Though not controlling, the Court's reasoning in
Gardner in resolving the conflict between the need for a
2IaM at 357-58.
26In Woodson, the Court held that the North Carolina death
penalty scheme, because it lacked individualized sentencing and
heightened reliability, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-305.The previously cited
passage from Woodson specifically rooted individualized sentenc-
ing in the Eighth Amendment. But the specific constitutional basis
for the principle of heightened reliability was not explicit in
Woodson. Not until Gardner did the Court make it unmistakably
clear that heightened reliability was grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
27Gardner, 430 U.S. at 359.
18Id.
more complete picture of the defendant and the need for
an accurate picture of the defendant is persuasive on the
issue of unadjudicated acts.The goal of capital sentencing is
to have the sentencer make a reasoned determination.The
sentencer, in determining whether the defendant would
commit future criminal acts of violence, certainly needs a
complete picture of the defendant's history of violence and
non-violence to make a reasoned determination. And, it is
unlikely that a defendant's mere record of convictions will
provide a complete picture of the defendant.The need for a
complete picture of the defendant, as Gardner demon-
strates however, is not the only ingredient for a reasoned
determination. The sentencer also needs an accurate pic-
ture of the defendant.Thus while it is important that a jury
be able to consider evidence of unadjudicated acts, it is
equally important to ensure that the jury be allowed to con-
sider such acts only if the defendant actually committed
them. Otherwise, though the sentencer will consider more
evidence than the defendant's criminal record, the sen-
tencer will by no means obtain a fuller and more accurate
picture of the defendant.
Individualized sentencing and heightened reliability,
despite sharing the same birthday and an encounter in
Gardner, have for the most part been developed separately
in subsequent cases.The two main cases invoking the prin-
ciple of individualized sentencing are Lockett v. Ohio" and
Barefoot v.Estelle.30 In Lockett, the Court invalidated an Ohio
statute that precluded the sentencer from considering "any
aspect of the defendant's character or record or any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death:'3' In Barefoot the
Court, uncomfortable with the defendant-preferred
approach in Lockett,3 2 made clear that the all relevant evi-
dence doctrine applied with equal force to aggravating evi-
dence.33As the Court put it," [TIhere is no doubt that the psy-
chiatric testimony increased the likelihood that petitioner
would be sentenced to death, but this fact does not make
the evidence inadmissible, any more than it would with
respect to other relevant evidence"3 In short, individualized
sentencing has developed into a broad principle that allows
the jury to consider all relevant evidence and applies with
equal force to mitigating and aggravating evidence.
The Supreme Court cases following Gardner have
relied on the principle of heightened reliability to require
or justify extra process. The cases have not, for the most
part, talked about heightened reliability in terms of the
accuracy or quality of the sentencing information as did
cases like Gregg and Gardner In Beck v. Alabama35 the
Court recognized that the heightened reliability principle
'9438 U.S. 586 (1978)
10463 U.S. 880 (1983).
3Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
3"Smith, 93 COLUM. L. REv. at 1255.
3Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897 (citingJurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76).
"Id. at 905.
35447 U.S. 625 (1980).
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will invalidate "procedural rules that tended to diminish the
reliability of the sentencing determination" in a capital case
though not necessarily in a non-capital case.3 In other
cases, the Court has found that heightened reliability
requires additional protections that may not be warranted
in non-capital cases. 37 The principle of heightened reliabili-
ty is thus concerned with both the reliability of the sen-
tencing information as well as sentencing procedures (or
lack of procedures) that make a sentencer's decision less
reliable. Evidence of unadjudicated acts of violence, and the
admission of such acts without a corresponding standard of
proof, implicate both of these concerns.
In fact, passages from Jurek and Gregg suggest that
these concerns are paramount when the sentencer is a jury
and its decision is based on predicting the defendant's
future dangerousness. In Jurek the defendant challenged
the future dangerousness aggravator in the Texas sentenc-
ing scheme on the basis that predicting future behavior is
impossible.The Court first conceded that predicting future
behavior is difficult. But it then added that since trial courts
predict future behavior on a daily basis, such as whether to
grant bail or not, it is not impossible for a jury of twelve peo-
ple to predict future behavior- The Court either failed to
recognize the different levels of experience in predicting
future behavior between a trial court and a jury or it failed
to consider the disparity sufficient to make future danger-
ousness an impermissible aggravator. More likely, it is the lat-
ter explanation in light of the previously cited passage from
Gregg. In Gregg, the Court recognized that the difference in
sentencing experience between a trial judge and a jury
transformed accurate sentencing information into an "indis-
pensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of
whether a defendant should live or die."39 Read together,
Jurek and Gregg demonstrate that while a jury's lack of
experience in predicting future behavior does not make
such a prediction impossible, its lack of experience is not
irrelevant.The ultimate decision for which the jury is being
asked to predict future behavior is, after all, not whether the
defendant should be given bail; it is whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death. Given all of these factors, i.e.
the jury's lack of experience in predicting future behavior,
the ultimate decision it must make, and the recognition in
Gregg that the disparity in sentencing experience between
a trial judge and jury makes accurate sentencing informa-
tion indispensable, it follows that procedures for ensuring
'6Beck, 447 U.S. at 638 rf.14.
3"See e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that
the Due Process Clause requires that an indigent defendant be pro-
vided with the basic tools to marshal his defense.) Justice Burger's
concurring opinion clearly reflects the heightened reliability prin-
ciple where he states,"[i]n capital cases the finality of the sentence
imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in
other cases. Nothing in the Court's opinion reaches non-capital
cases.'Ake, 470 U.S. at 87.
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76.
"'Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190.
that the jury relies upon accurate and sufficient sentencing
information are equally indispensable. A sentencing
scheme, in order to be constitutional, must strike a balance
between individualized sentencing and heightened reliabil-
ity.As a federal district court recently observed:
[it is Constitutionally essential to assure that
the principle of heightened reliability serves as
a meaningful limit to the admission of "all rele-
vant evidence" in order to prevent the less
stringent concept of relevance from predomi-
nating over the cardinal principle of reliability.
This necessarily requires a balance to be struck
between these two competing doctrines.'
The question then becomes, has Virginia, through its
statutory scheme or courts struck a balance between these
two competing Constitutional doctrines? Is any threshold
test of reliability required before the jury is allowed to con-
sider evidence of unadjudicated acts in determining future
dangerousness? Are there any procedures in place to ensure
that a capital jury considers accurate information only?
M. The Use of Unadjudicated Acts in Virginia
Virginia courts have done exactly what other courts
warned against: they have consistently and repeatedly
allowed the principle of individualized sentencing, or
the "all relevant evidence" doctrine, to trample the prin-
ciple of heightened reliability. Virginia Code Section
19.2-264.4 provides Virginia courts with the statutory
authority to admit prior unadjudicated acts and the
Supreme Court of Virginia has invokedJurek to give this
practice constitutional support. The Supreme Court of
Virginia has responded to Due Process challenges to the
practice of admitting evidence of unadjudicated acts
without a corresponding standard of proof in one of
three ways. None of these responses, however, have
answered these challenges in any meaningful way.
The practice of admitting evidence of unadjudicated
acts of violence to prove future dangerousness has both a
statutory and, through Virginia case law, a constitutional
basis. Under Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(B),"evidence
may be presented as to any matter which the court deems
relevant to sentence" and this includes the "history and
background of the defendant" in determining future dan-
gerousness."' In Peterson v. Commonwealth, 2 the Supreme
-°United States v. Beckford, 964 ESupp. 993, 1000 (E.D. Va..
1997)
4tSee Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C), which states that "[t]he
penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant ... that he
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a con-
tinuing serious threat to society,'as further support for the admission
of unadjudicated acts in the capital sentencing proceeding.
42225 Va. 289, 302 S.E.2d 520 (1983).
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Court of Virginia, interpreting code sections 19.2-264.4(B)
and (C), held that in determining a defendant's propensity
for violence, "it is clear that more than the mere police
record of the defendant may be introduced." 3 Following
Peterson, the court met one of its first lack of reliability
challenges in Poyner v. Commonwealth.4" In Poyner, the
Commonwealth introduced the defendant's videotaped
confession to five unadjudicated murders in the sentencing
proceeding. Poyner argued that the evidence was irrelevant
and unreliable." The court answered Poyner's objection
with the conclusory statement," [h]ere, defendant's confes-
sion to five murders was highly reliable and wholly relevant
to the issue of future dangerousness
"' 4 6
In Watkins v. Commonwealth, 7 the court firmly estab-
lished as a general principle what it had done in previous
cases such as PoynerThe court stated,"we hold that evidence
of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct, while generally not
admissible in the guilt phase of capital-murder trial, may be
used in the penalty phase to prove the defendant's propensi-
ty to commit criminal acts of violence in the future."48 In addi-
tion to stating a general principle for the use of unadjudicat-
ed acts in capital sentencing, the court inWatkins also recog-
nized, as support for its general principle, the all relevant evi-
dence doctrine set forth in Jurek."9 Thus, Watkins firmly
established the principle in Virginia, that in determining
future dangerousness, it is constitutionally essential that the
jury consider all relevant evidence, which necessarily
includes evidence of unadjudicated acts of violence.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has responded to chal-
lenges to the reliability of such evidence in several ways-
none of which demonstrate any recognition or regard for
the Fourteenth Amendment's heightened reliability require-
ment.The main response has been simply to avoid the issue.
This avoidance technique was developed in two cases. In
the first case, Beaver v. Commonwealth,0 the defendant
argued that evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity
"was not reliable and thus should not have been considered
in deciding whether" he presented a future danger to soci-
ety."' The court responded that all relevant evidence should
be admitted; that it had repeatedly and consistently relied
on that principle in prior cases; thatJurek approved of this
practice; and that it saw no reason to depart from prior
cases. 2 The court concluded that the unadjudicated acts of
violence "were relevant to the issue of future dangerous-
ness."" In short, the court never directly responded to
defendant's lack of reliability objection.
13Peterson, 225 Va. at 298,302 S.E.2d at 526.
44229 Va. 401,329 S.E.2d 815 (1985).
4Poyner, 229 Va. at 418,329 S.E.2d at 827.
41Id. at 418,302 S.E.2d at 828.
-229 Va. 469,331 S.E.2d 422 (1985)
IsWatkins, 229 Va. at 488,331 S.E.2d at 436.
49Id. at 487, 331 S.E.2d at 436.
5232 Va. 521,352 S.E.2d 342 (1987).
"Beaver, 232Va. at 528,352 S.E.2d at 346.
11Id. at 529-30,352 S.E.2d at 347.
"Id. at 530,352 S.E.2d at 347.
In the second case, Stockton v. Commonwealth,54 the
defendant raised several objections to the admission of
unadjudicated acts testimony based on the Due Process
Clause. Stockton argued that if unadjudicated acts of vio-
lence are admissible to prove future dangerousness,
"Virginia's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional
because it fails to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of the commission of the unadjudicated crimes and thus
permits the jury to consider unreliable and prejudicial evi-
dence: 5  The court responded: "in Beaver v.
Commonwealth ... we rejected a contention that evidence
of unadjudicated criminal activity is 'not reliable!"5 Of
course, Beaver did not reject a contention that such evi-
dence is unreliable. At best, Beaver held that the specific
evidence of unadjudicated acts in that case raised no con-
cems about its reliability. At worst, Beaver held that the reli-
ability of such evidence is an irrelevant consideration.
In addition, Beaver is not controlling since Beaver did
not raise the Due Process objection raised by Stockton.
Moreover, unless Beaver stands for the broad proposition
that reliability of evidence of unadjudicated acts is always an
irrelevant consideration, it is difficult to see how the deter-
mination of the reliability of the specific evidence offered in
Beaver is controlling on the determination of the reliability
of the specific evidence offered in Stockton. Rather, the
determination of the reliability of evidence of unadjudicated
acts would seem more appropriately to require a case by
case inquiry.The court in Stockton, however, seemed to sug-
gest that Beaver answered the question of reliability once
and for all. Regardless of how one interprets Beaver, togeth-
er Beaver and Stockton established an automatic response
to lack of reliability objections without ever actually consid-
ering them. In at least three cases following Stockton, the
court has rejected the due process argument by simply cit-
ing Stockton 57 and never addressing the claim.
The court has also applied a "presumption of reliabili-
ty" to evidence of unadjudicated acts as another way of
combating the defendant's lack of reliability objection.This
"presumption of reliability" shifts to the defendant the bur-
den of proving that the evidence is unreliable. In Pruett v.
Thompson," for example, a federal district court reviewed
Pruett's claims that the evidence of an unadjudicated mur-
der should not have been admitted. The court first noted
that such evidence is relevant to future dangerousness. It
then stated," [t]he result may of course differ if the evidence
presented is plainly unreliable,... but there is no indication
in the record that any of the evidence Pruett complains
about was so unreliable"y 9 In other words, unadjudicated
5241 Va. 192,402 S.E.2d 196 (1991).
5Stockton, 241 Va. at 210,402 S.E.2d at 206.
5Id. at 210,402 S.E.2d at 206 (citations omitted).
57See Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220,228,421 S.E.2d
821,826 (1993);Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413,418-19,
437 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1993); Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va.
222,228,441 S.E.2d 195,200 (1994).
5771 ESupp. 1428 (E.D.Va. 1991).
"Pruett, 771 ESupp.at 1443.
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acts are presumptively reliable and the burden is on the
defendant to show otherwise.
Although this observation was made by a federal district
court rather than the Supreme Court of Virginia, similar"pre-
sumption of reliability" sentiments are present in cases decid-
ed by the Supreme Court of Virginia. In Gray v.
Commonwealth,6" for example, after recognizing that the
jury accredited the testimony of the Commonwealth's wit-
ness over the defendant's, the court stated,"[w]e cannot say
Tucker's testimony was incredible as a matter of law."6
Likewise in O'Dell v. Commonwealth,' O'Dell objected to
the admission of evidence regarding an attempted rape in
Florida. He claimed that the charges had been dismissed on
the merits, for lack of evidence. The Supreme Court of
Virginia reviewed the record and found no evidence that the
charges were dismissed on the merits.63 The court, at no point
in its opinion, indicated or explained why the attempted rape
charge was dismissed.Yet, since the defendant was unable to
prove that it was dismissed on the merits, the evidence of the
attempted rape charge was admitted. This presumption of
reliability of unadjudicated acts contradicts the Due Process
standards of heightened reliability in capital cases.
Heightened reliability is not met by presumptions."
The final way that the Supreme Court of Virginia has
dealt with claims of lack of reliability of unadjudicated acts is
the "cross-examination cure"The court's approach is that all
relevant evidence should be admitted so long as the defen-
dant can cross-examine the adverse witnesses.The reasoning
presumes cross-examination ensures reliability.This approach
is illustrated in several cases. One example is Yeatts v.
Commonwealth given above.Another example is the case of
Gray v. Commonwealth. There, the defendant denied any
involvement in two unadjudicated murders and argued that
the testimony of the Commonwealth's witness lacked relia-
bility.The court responded:"[d]etermining the credibility of
witnesses is peculiarly within the province of the jury... Gray
was connected to the Sorrell murders by the testimony of
MelvinTucker.The jury heard and observed bothTucker and
Gray and apparently chose to believe Tucker 65 These cases
illustrate why the "cross-examination cure" is a disingenuous
response and why a standard of proof is needed.The "cross-
examination cure" rests on the notion that so long as cross-
examination is permitted the jury should be allowed to judge
the credibility of each witness thus ensuring the reliability of
-233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157 (1987).
6"Gray, 233 Va. at 347,356 S.E.2d at 176.
"234Va. 672,364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).
O'Dell, 234 Va. at 700,364 S.E.2d at 507.
'More troubling perhaps, is the fact that in Pruett v.
Thompson the court found that Pruett's confession, which was so
incomplete and self-contradicting that the interrogators were not
confident that Pruett in fact killed Debra Mclnnis, see Pruett v.
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266,284,351 S.E.2d 1,12 (1986), did not
satisfy its "plainly unreliable" standard. Pruett, 771 E Supp. at 1443.
One wonders whether that standard could ever be met.
"Gray, 233 Va. at 346-47,356 S.E.2d at 175-76.
the evidence.At this stage in the defendant's trial, however,
the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed a capital murder. It is fair to assume that the
defendant's credibility is not on par with other witnesses.
Moreover, without a standard of proof the jury is without any
guidance as to how convinced it must be that the defendant
committed the unadjudicated acts. Without any guidance,
the jury's determination boils down to who it believes, the
defendant or the Commonwealth's witness; the jury's inquiry
should be, did the unadjudicated act occur and did the defen-
dant commit it. When the jury's determination devolves into
simply who it believes, given the defendant's likely complete
lack of credibility, the jury's decision is vulnerable to inaccu-
rate information and untruthful testimony. This type of
unguided capital sentencing process is a far cry from the con-
stitutional requirement of heightened reliability.
IV. Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof
To achieve the constitutionally required balance
between "individualized sentencing" and "heightened relia-
bility" several federal courts have maintained that "unadju-
dicated conduct may be presented to the jury only if the
Court has determined that it meets the threshold test of reli-
ability"' A standard of proof satisfies this requirement and
serves another important function. A consideration of the
reasons behind each function as well as a comparison of the
standard of proof requirement in other contexts, explain
why proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for unad-
judicated acts in capital sentencing.
A. The Dual Function of a Standard of Proof
A standard of proof serves dual functions. With any
determination that a sentencer makes some risk of a factu-
ally erroneous decision exists.A standard of proof establish-
es a threshold of reliability that a particular decision must
satisfy. The frequency with which an erroneous decision
will occur varies depending upon how high or low a stan-
dard of proof is set.67 This is the risk-allocation function of a
standard of proof. The second function of a standard of
proof is the symbolic one; it impresses upon the jury or
court the degree of confidence society expects for a partic-
ular determination."
The risk-allocation function assumes that "in a judicial
proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of
some earlier event, the factfinder cannot acquire unassail-
ably accurate knowledge of what happened."19 Because of
"Beckford, 964 E Supp. at 1000. See also, United States v.
Davis, 912 ESupp. 938,949 (E.D. La. 1996); Walker, 910 ESupp. at
853-54; United States v. Bradley, 880 ESupp. 271, 286-87(M.D. Pa.
1994);Milton v. Procunie, 744 E2d 1091,1096 (5th Cir. 1984).
"In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (HarlanJ., con-
curring). See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425 (1979).
"'In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364,370.
6Id. at 370 (Harlan,J., concurring).
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this inability to acquire perfect knowledge, "the trier of fact
will sometimes, despite [its] best efforts, be wrong in [its]
factual conclusions:" For any given determination then
there are two possible erroneous decisions. In the ordinary
criminal case, for example, the two possible erroneous
decisions are that a factually innocent person will be con-
victed or a factually guilty person will go free.A standard of




The Court has compared the interests of the two par-
ties when deciding what standard of proof should govern a
particular decision.72 In In Re Winship,7 the Court stated,
"[wihere one party has at stake an interest of transcending
value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-[the risk of an
erroneous decision] is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of producing a suffi-
ciency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt 74 In other words, since an individual
defendant's interest in his or her liberty is greater than the
government's interest in punishing the person, the burden
of proof should reduce the risk that an innocent person will
be convicted based on a factual error.Thus, in a criminal
case, Due Process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
7"
In a capital sentencing proceeding where a jury must
find that the defendant committed the unadjudicated acts
before relying upon them in assessing future dangerous-
ness, given the relative interests at stake, Due Process
demands nothing less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The capital defendant's interest in his or her life, is
surely as transcendent a value as the ordinary criminal
defendant's liberty interest. Indeed, given the Court's recog-
nition in Woodson that death is qualitatively different from
any other type of punishment, the defendant in a capital
sentencing proceeding has the most fundamental value of
all at stake- his or her life.A death sentence and execution
based on a factual error is certainly the most undesirable
erroneous decision a factfinder can make. On the other
hand, the government has an interest in seeing that a per-
son who deserves the death penalty, that is a person who
satisfies all of the statutory and constitutional criteria,
receives it. An erroneous decision against the government
in a capital sentencing proceeding, however, is even less
undesirable than an erroneous decision in a typical criminal
70Id.
711d. at 371.
72Addington, 441 U.S. at 425; See also Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319,334-35 (1976) (stating that due process requires con-
sideration of the private interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the private interest under the current procedures,
the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards, and the government's interest, including the function
involved and the burden of an additional or substitute procedural
requirement).
71397 U.S. 358 (1970).
7 Spelser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,525-26 (1958).
711n Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
case. In the typical criminal case, an erroneous decision
against the government results in a factually guilty person
going free. In a capital sentencing proceeding inVirginia, an
erroneous decision against the government results in a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Thus, in light of the relative underlying interests at stake in
a capital sentencing proceeding, the Due Process Clause
requires the Commonwealth to prove and the jury to find
that the defendant committed the alleged unadjudicated
acts beyond a reasonable doubt before relying upon them.
Similar, but slightly different reasoning supports the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard under the symbolic
function served by a standard of proof. Given the underly-
ing assumption that, a "factfinder cannot acquire unassail-
ably accurate knowledge of what happened", then the
most that a"factfinder can acquire is a belief of what prob-
ably happened' 76 A standard of proof instructs and
impresses upon the factfinder "the degree of confidence
our society thinks [it] should have in the correctness of
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication:
"Increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress the
factfinder with the importance of the decision and thereby
perhaps reduce the chances that"7 a death sentence will
be imposed inappropriately.
In Virginia the decision whether to impose a death sen-
tence can turn solely on the future dangerousness aggrava-
tor, and thus, solely on evidence of unadjudicated acts of
violence allegedly committed by the defendant. It is essen-
tial to impress upon the jury the gravity of its decision and
keep it focused on the proper inquiry. The current proce-
dure, or rather lack of procedure, reduces and changes the
jury's inquiry to who it believes instead of whether it is con-
vinced that the unadjudicated act actually occurred and
that the defendant did it. The considerations behind the
symbolic function of a standard of proof, coupled with Due
Process requirement of heightened reliability in death
penalty cases, demand that the jury be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the alleged unadjudicated act
occurred and that the defendant committed it before rely-
ing upon such acts in imposing a death penalty.
B. Comparing the Standard of Proof for
Unadjudicated Acts in Other Cases
Other standard of proof cases decided by the
Supreme Court bolster the conclusion that a beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard is required for unadjudicated con-
duct in capital sentencing.
The Supreme Court, in determining the threshold of
reliability for evidence whose relevance, and thus admis-
sibility, turns upon "preliminary factual questions" has
"traditionally required that these matters be established
by a preponderance of proof."79 In McMillan v.
761n Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan,J., concurring).
vId.
7Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
"Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,175 (1987).
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Pennsylvania0 the Court considered whether the Due
Process Clause was violated where the state required a
five year minimum mandatory sentence if the sentenc-
ing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during
the commission of the offense.8 ' The defendant's basic
argument was that visible firearm possession was "an
element of the crime for which [he was] being sen-
tenced and thus must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."8 2 The Court rejected the defendant's argument.
The Court observed that visible firearm possession does
not alter "the maximum penalty for the crime commit-
ted nor create a separate offense calling for a separate
penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's
discretion in selecting a penalty within the range
already available to it:8 3 Thus, the Due Process Clause
requires only a preponderance of the evidence standard
when the unadjudicated act is "a sentencing considera-
tion and not an element of any offense.""4
The Court's rationale in McMillan does not apply in
a capital sentencing proceeding for several reasons.
First, and most obviously, the Supreme Court has clearly
recognized that the death penalty context is qualitative-
ly different from any other context. Second, a finding of
future dangerousness based on evidence of unadjudicat-
ed acts calls for a separate and qualitatively greater max-
imum penalty, namely the death penalty, than the penal-
ty called for absent such a finding. Third, future danger-
ousness can be based solely on unadjudicated acts and
is not simply a sentencing consideration. Future dan-
gerousness is a separate element, one of the two possi-
ble aggravators, for imposing a death sentence.
Additionally, in McMillan the trial judge was required to
decide a "simple, straightforward issue susceptible of
objective proof"'8 -i.e. whether the defendant visibly
possessed a firearm. A capital jury in Virginia, on the
other hand, is required to make the less concrete, more
subjective prediction of whether, in light of the defen-
dant's history, there is a probability he or she would
commit future criminal acts of violence that constitute a
continuing serious threat to society. In short, the con-
siderations that made preponderance sufficient to satis-
fy Due Process in McMillan, if they apply at all in the
capital sentencing proceeding, suggest that a higher
standard of proof is required to satisfy the Due Process
requirement of heightened reliability.8
-'477 U.S. 79 (1986).




85McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
V. Conclusion
For a capital sentencing scheme to satisfy the
Constitution, it must balance two competing constitutional
principles: individualized sentencing and heightened relia-
bility. The Virginia sentencing scheme and the Supreme
Court ofVirginia have struck an unconstitutional balance by
giving effect only to the EighthAmendment's individualized
sentencing requirement. By focusing only on the notion
that all relevant evidence be admitted, the Supreme Court
of Virginia has ignored and undermined the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement of heightened reliability. While
unadjudicated acts of violence are certainly relevant to
determining future dangerousness, no procedure ensures
that they meet any threshold of reliability.The best and sim-
plest way to balance these two competing doctrines is to
allow the jury to consider evidence of unadjudicated acts in
determining future dangerousness only after it first deter-
mines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant com-
mitted the acts. A beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
the standard commanded in light of the dual functions of a
standard of proof, the particular decision being made, a
comparison of other similar Supreme Court cases, and the
Court's central and fundamental premise that because
death is different there exists a greater need for reliability in
the decision to impose it.
"See United States v. Watts, 117 S.Ct. 633 (1997). In Watts
the Court held that a sentencing court may consider criminal
conduct for which the defendant was acquitted so long as the
government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
the conduct occurred and the defendant did it.While observ-
ing that the Due Process is usually satisfied by a preponder-
ance standard at sentencing, the Court acknowledged that
where relevant conduct might dramatically increase the sen-
tence a higher standard of proof may be required.The use of
unadjudicated acts to prove future dangerousness is the quin-
tessential relevant conduct that can dramatically increase the
defendant's sentence. Given that the Court has held that the
Due Process clause requires heightened reliability in death
penalty cases, and that Due Process requires a preponderance
standard of proof in sentencing for ordinary criminal cases, it
follows that Due Process clause requires a beyond reasonable
doubt standard of proof for unadjudicated acts upon which a
death sentence can be wholly based.
